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COUNTER REVOLUTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEAL - THE AFTERMATH OF VERMONT YANKEE 1
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been growing judicial concern about the fair-
ness of action by administrative agencies and the ability of courts to ef-
fectively review this action.2 This concern$ stems from the increased use
of informal procedures4 by agencies promulgating rules5 or orders," to ac-
1. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
2. Kestenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond the APA Criteria for Trial-Type Procedures and
the FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 679, 689-90 (1976); Wright, The Courts
and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 379-
80 (1974); Comment, Administrative Law - Administrative Procedure - Notice and Com-
ment Rulemaking - Vermont Yankee v. NRDC, 1979 Wisc. L. REv. 314, 326-27 [herein-
after cited as Administrative Procedure].
3. The courts felt that the increased use of informal procedures and the "on the record"
talisman of United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), would insulate
agency action from effective judicial review. Under § 553 procedures, the litigant may not
have the opportunity to discover and challenge the evidentiary materials upon which the
agency action was based. The concern has been heightened by the perception of agency
"failure" and the perceived need for more effective examination of agency decisions. More-
over, scrutiny of agency decisions can be limited to notice and comment proceedings when
the agency's substantive statute provides for review in the courts of appeal. These courts do
not have the machinery to flush out the reasoning behind an agency decision often based
upon post hoc rationalization and a one-sided record. See generally S. BREYER & R. STEw-
ART, AD mINSTRATrvE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 499-511 (1979).
4. An agency, if delegated the power by Congress to do so, has the discretion to accom-
plish congressional objectives either by informal rulemaking, formal rulemaking or adjudica-
tion. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194 (1947). Informal rulemaking is often called "notice and comment" rulemaking and is
governed by 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). In pertinent part, the section requires the agency to
publish a notice of the proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. The notice must give
the time, place and nature of the proceedings, the legal authority under which the rule is
proposed, and either the substance of the proposed rule or a description of the issues in-
volved. After notice has been given, the agency must allow interested parties the opportu-
nity to comment on the rulemaking in writing or, at the agency's discretion, by oral presen-
tation. Once the agency has considered all the relevant materials presented, it must set out
in the rule a statement of its basis and purpose.
Rules promulgated via informal procedures are subject to judicial review and can be set
aside if they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with the law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). In making these determinations the court must
review the whole record that was before the administrative agency when it made its deci-
sion. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park Inc. v.
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complish the congressional objectives set out in their substantive statutes.
In response, certain federal courts of appeal have begun to impose upon
these agencies more procedural safeguards than are required by either the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)7 or substantive statutes.8 These ju-
dicially imposed safeguards are more commonly known as hybrid
procedures."
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See generally Barr, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking
Procedure: When May Something More Formal be Required?, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 781 (1978).
Section 553(c) further provides that if the agency enabling statute requires that rules are
to be made "on the record" after an agency hearing, the formal rulemaking provisions of
§§ 556 and 557 apply. These sections, in essence, require adversarial trial-type procedures.
See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:4 (2d ed. 1978). The Supreme Court has
held that before §§ 556 and 557 procedures are required the agency enabling statute must
specifically state that the rule is to be based "on the record." Therefore, the phrase "after
hearing" does not trigger formal procedures. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224 (1973).
One exception to the "on the record" requirement is a constitutional due process concern
which is present when a small group of individuals is substantially affected by agency action
which does not afford them a hearing. See Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
But cf. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (assessment
promulgated by a general rule which affected all residents equally did not require individu-
alized hearing to be consistent with due process).
The standard of judicial review for formal agency rulemaking or adjudication is provided
for in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976).
5. "'Rule' means the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular appli-
cability and future effect designed to implement, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency . . " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1976).
6. An order is defined as "the whole or part of a final disposition, whether affirmative,
negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking
but including licensing . . . ." Id. § 551(6) (1976).
The process through which an agency formulates an order is called adjudication. Id.
§ 551(7). As with rulemaking, there are two types of adjudication, formal and informal. The
APA does not provide for informal adjudicatory procedures but formal adjudication is gov-
erned by § 554. Again, as in formal rulemaking, the procedural safeguards of §§ 556 and 557
are required if an adjudicatory decision is to be based "on the record" after an agency hear-
ing. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
It should be noted that the Supreme Court only considered rulemaking in Vermont Yan-
kee; hence, it may not have precedential impact upon cases involving adjudication.
7. Act of June 11, 1960, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-52, 553-59, 701-06
(1976)).
8. Substantive statute, organic statute and enabling statute all refer to the congressional
statutory delegation of power to an administrative agency to perform essentially legislative
functions.
9. Hybrid procedures in the context of this comment are procedures that are not man-
dated by the APA or an agency substantive statute but are imposed by the court on remand.
In response to the concerns stemming from the increased use of informal rulemaking,
courts began requiring agencies to articulate in detail the grounds for their decisions and to
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The Supreme Court responded to this judicial imposition of safeguards
upon administrative agencies in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC).1° The Court totally re-
jected the notions that the APA established the minimum procedural
safeguards and that courts could require additional safeguards.1 The
Court supported its holding by pointing out that prior case law 2 and the
legislative history of the APA" revealed that the APA specified all proce-
dures required of an agency promulgating a rule informally. 4 The Court
respond in the record to criticisms and contrary evidence given by those opposing agency
action. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Stew-
art, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review
of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons From the Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713,
729-33 (1977). These judicially imposed hybrid procedures are less formal than §§ 556 and
557 but more substantial than mere notice and comment requirements. Types of hybrid
procedures which have been imposed are cross examination, Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483
F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973);
oral hearings, International Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and
written statements of methodology and inquiry conferences. See generally Williams, "Hy-
brid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analy-
sis, 42 U. CM. L. REv. 401 (1975).
There has been a strong debate over whether the use of hybrid procedures does in fact
promote fairness and more efficient agency administration, or whether it creates tools which
challenging parties can use to delay agency proceedings, force the agency to adopt a softer
position, or discredit agency data. Congress has entrusted these agencies with the power to
promote policy and safeguards for the public good. The courts should review agency action
to keep agencies honest but should not contravene congressional prerogatives in the process.
Compare Williams, supra note 9, at 443-45 and Wright, supra note 2, at 379-80 with Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court, 1979 SuP. CT. REV.
345.
10. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont Yankee)
applied to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), now known as the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, for a license to operate its nuclear power plant. The AEC decided that before
it would grant additional licenses it would determine through a generic rulemaking proceed-
ing the environmental hazards of spent nuclear fuel. The results of this rulemaking would
then be applied generally to subsequent on the record adjudicatory hearings required for
plant licensing, hence dispensing with further consideration of the spent fuel issue. The
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) intervened and objected to both the gen-
eric rulemaking proceedings and the granting of a license to Vermont Yankee. On review the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed both of the AEC's decisions
on the grounds that the rulemaking procedure was inadequate because it failed to expose
the spent fuel issue to sufficient adversarial probing, and therefore the licensing, which was
based on defective rulemaking, was invalid. NRDC v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The Supreme Court reversed this decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
11. Id. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. at 524, 545-46.
12. Id. at 523-25.
13. Id. at 545-46.
14. Id. at 525, 545.
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held that a reviewing court is precluded from imposing additional proce-
dures upon administrative agencies"" and should only determine whether
an agency finding is "sustainable on the administrative record made.","
The Supreme Court acknowledged that when in the sphere of adminis-
trative rulemaking "a very small number of persons are 'exceptionally af-
fected, in each case upon individual grounds,"' constitutional due process
may require additional procedures.17 It further noted that if an agency
unjustifiedly departed from long standing procedure judicial correction
may be required.2
8
Although the Court stated that it disagreed with the court of appeal's
decision, it remanded the case "so that the Court of Appeals may review
the rule as the Administrative Procedure Act provides."' 9 The Court's
grounds for remand seem to be the basis of considerable confusion. One
commentator feels that the Court remanded the case to have the court of
appeals review the agency's procedures to see if they comply with the
APA.' 0 Another argues that the lower court could review the administra-
tive record to see if it adequately supported the agency's decision.2
If the Supreme Court did indeed remand so that an adequate record
could be formulated by the agency, it appears that the Court itself vio-
lated its own ban on procedural innovation in the courts2 because lower
courts will remand agency action so that a more thorough record than is
15. The Court held that "Absent constitutional contraints or extremely compelling cir-
cumstances the 'administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of proce-
dure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multi-
tudinous duties."' Id. at 543 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1968)).
16. 435 U.S. at 549.
17. Id. at 542 (quoting United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. at 245).
18. 435 U.S. at 542.
19. Id. at 549.
20. Scalia, supra note 9, at 359. Professor Scalia's opinion is based upon the Court's state-
ment that "intimations in the majority opinion which suggest the judges who joined it like-
wise may have thought the administrative proceedings an insufficient basis upon which to
predicate the rule in question. We accordingly remand so that the Court of Appeals may
review the rule as the Administrative Procedure Act provides." 435 U.S. at 549.
21. Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statu-
tory Misinterpretation, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 183, 188 nn.25 & 26 (1979). Professor Nathan-
son predicates his opinion upon the same quote as Professor Scalia by construing the phrase
"administrative proceedings" to mean the "resultant record." His opinion is further bol-
stered by Mr. Justice Rehnquist's explanation that if an agency finding "is not sustainable
on the administrative record made, then the ... decision must be vacated and the matter
remanded ... for further consideration .... The court should engage in this kind of re-
view and not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format. ... " 435
U.S. at 549 (citations omitted).
22. See S. BRanyT & R. STEWART, supra note 3, at 519-20 n.78.
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required by the APA can be generated. This will encourage if not compel
an agency to impose further procedures upon itself in order to comply
with the court order.
The decision in Vermont Yankee received a large degree of attention
and criticism from respected commentators.2 3 Few came out in favor of
the opinion 2 and even fewer felt that it would have any lasting impact.25
No matter their predisposition to the opinions, the majority agreed that
the Supreme Court had left some gaping loopholes which the lower courts
would use to circumvent the strong admonitions in Vermont Yankee.
This comment will delineate several deficiencies in the opinion as per-
ceived by various commentators and selected cases on point will be
analyzed.
II. LOWER COURT COUNTER REVOLUTION
A. Interpretation of Enabling Statutes
When a court reviews agency action it first must determine whether the
agency has complied with the mandates of the substantive statute and
legislative history. Consequently, some statutes have been interpreted to
require more substantively from an agency than is required by the APA.26
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,27 a case decided before Vermont Yankee,
the D.C. Circuit Court held that, before it could determine what proce-
dures were required of the FPC, it had to analyze the regulatory scheme
envisioned by Congress when it passed the Commission's substantive
statute28 in order to determine what was necessary to "effectuate the poli-
cies of [the] regulatory statute. '29 Following its analysis, the court held
that the FPC's section 553 rulemaking procedures had been inadequate
because the substantive statute required "substantial evidence" before a
court could approve the Commission's rate-making decisions. Therefore,
the FPC had to allow "testing" of its evidence "by procedures sufficiently
23. See, e.g., Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion,
1980 UTAH L. REv. 3; Scalia, supra note 9.
24. See, e.g., Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court's Role in the Nuclear Energy Con-
troversy, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1833 (1978); Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Ad-
ministrative Procedure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HAIv. L. REv. 1823 (1978).
25. See, e.g., K. DAvis, supra note 4; Nathanson, supra note 21; Stewart, Vermont Yan-
kee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1805 (1978).
26. Scalia, supra note 9, at 392-94.
27. 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
28. The Natural Gas Act of 1970, §§ 4, 5(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d(a) (1954).
29. 483 F.2d at 1254.
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adversary in nature to provide a reasonable guarantee of reliability."3
This idea of imposing additional procedures based on the statutory law
was rejected in Vermont Yankee when the Court disagreed with the
NRDC that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) substantive statute
required procedures other than those required by the APA.3 1 There is,
however, some evidence that the theory still survives in the federal courts
of appeal.
In Association of National Advertisers v. FTC2 the D.C. Circuit Court
upheld the Commission's promulgation of special rules for children's ad-
vertising proceedings. The court explained that while Vermont Yankee
"restricts the ability of courts to refashion normal rulemaking procedures
with judicially-conceived notions of administrative fair play, [i]t has no
bearing on the power of courts to interpret and apply congressional
directives."' s
A similar view was given by the same court in Geller v. FCC.3 Geller
petitioned the FCC to promulgate new rules governing cable television
because existing rules were not based upon what "would best serve the
public interest."' 5 The court interpreted the FCC's substantive statute"
to require the Commission, on its own initiative, to determine whether
rules promulgated for a prior purpose still served the public interest. As
the interrelationship between the Commission's rules and the public in-
terest were statutorily mandated, the court held that a review and re-
mand of the FCC's regulations did not run afoul of the "strictures on
imposition of judicially-created requirements on the rulemaking process
recently highlighted in Vermont Yankee . . . ."3 Therefore, despite the
holding in Vermont Yankee, some courts still seem to feel that they can
impose more upon an administrative agency than is required by the APA
if an interpretation of the agency's substantive statute requires it.38
30. Id. at 1264.
31. 435 U.S. at 548. See Scalia, supra note 9, at 392-93. Professor Scalia points out that
this process by the court is "barely distinguishable ... from the common law power theory"
that courts use to supplement the APA. Id. at 389-92. He bases his conclusion that Vermont
Yankee rejects this theory on the Supreme Court's disagreement with the D.C. Circuit
Court view that the NEPA required the development of new rulemaking procedures. 435
U.S. at 548.
32. 617 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
33. Id. at 619 n.10.
34. 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
35. Id. at 976.
36. Federal Communications Act of 1934 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1962)).
37. 610 F.2d at 980 n.58.
38. It should be noted that this type of an approach can also be applied to judicial inter-
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Although judicial interpretation of an agency's enabling statute may re-
quire more of that agency, the reviewing court's scope of review remains
narrow. In an important recent decision" the Supreme Court reversed a
Second Circuit opinion" which held that the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) was mandated by the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA)41 to give environmental factors, such as over-
crowding, determinative weight when it was considering the placement of
low income housing. The Supreme Court's response relied heavily on Ver-
mont Yankee and did not agree that the NEPA imposed such substantive
requirements. The Court held that the only task for a reviewing court is
to ascertain whether or not the agency considered the environmental con-
sequences.42 The court should not "interject itself within the area of dis-
cretion of the executive as to the choice of action to be taken.' 43
Therefore, at least with regard to the NEPA, courts cannot interpret
that statute to require more substantively than the plain language either
the NEPA or the APA provides.44
B. Adequacy of the Administrative Record on Review
Another technique used by courts to require more from an agency pro-
cedurally is its appraisal of the adequacy of the record on review.45 The
only way a court is able to determine whether an agency has complied
with all the procedures required by the APA, or any pertinent statute, is
by reviewing the record compiled during the rulemaking proceedings. 46
pretation of the standard of review, Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 578 F.2d 337,
344-50 (D.C. Cir. 1978); or the adequacy of the agency record on review, Katherine Gibbs
School Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 663-64 (2d Cir. 1979). See notes 64-75 infra and accompa-
nying text.
39. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per
curiam).
40. Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332(2)(E) (1970).
42. 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
43. Id. at 227-28 (citations omitted).
44. The Court stated in Vermont Yankee: "[W]e search in vain for something in NEPA
which would mandate such a result .... [I]t is clear NEPA cannot serve as the basis for a
substantial revision of the carefully constructed procedural specifications of the APA." 435
U.S. at 548. Therefore, it has been observed "that only the plainest of language [will] satisfy
the present Court" that a substantive statute requires more either procedurally or substan-
tively than the APA provides. See Scalia, supra note 9, at 393-94.
45. For a thorough discussion, see Davis, supra note 23, at 16; Nathanson, supra note 21,
at 205-06; Scalia, supra note 9, at 394-95; Wright, supra note 2, at 394-95; Comment, Ad-
ministrative Procedure, supra note 2, at 333-36.
46. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923
1981]
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Though a court cannot directly impose certain hybrid procedures on an
agency,47 many times the only way an agency can provide an adequate
record is for it to follow adversarial procedures not mandated by the
APA.
It should be noted that there are several facets to this type of an ap-
proach. Courts can determine that a record is inadequate because: (1) it
does not specifically respond to a challenger's criticisms,4s (2) the record
does not provide adequate support for the rule,49 (3) the court needs a
more complete record to understand the agency's decisionmaking pro-
cess, 50 or (4) the agency did not provide all the information it relied on in
the record.5 1 These possibilities for deviation from the strict mandates of
Vermont Yankee are still viable because the Supreme Court never ad-
dressed the lower court's concern with the inadequacies of the Commis-
sion's record in that case.5 2 Consequently, this technique seems to have
become a pervasive approach among reviewing courts for setting aside
agency action. In fact, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in East
Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States5" specifically addressed
the Supreme Court's oversight. The court was reviewing an Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) decision granting a carrier temporary au-
thority to transport commodities from Texas to Arizona." The ICC ar-
gued that Vermont Yankee precluded the court from requiring the Com-
mission to explicitly explain in the record the reasons for its decision.
Although the court upheld the ICC decision, it stated:
We do not think that Vermont Yankee prevents this court from remanding
for an administrative explanation in an appropriate case. The Court did not
purport to address the principle that in order to preserve effective review, a
court could demand a reasoned decision from an administrative agency. Un-
like Vermont Yankee, the concern in this case is not with the adequacy of
administrative fact finding but the effectiveness of judicial review.5
The D.C. Circuit Court took this dictum even further in Weyerhaeuser
(1971).
47. 435 U.S. at 524.
48. See National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1979).
49. See Central Fla. Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Aqua Slide 'N'
Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978).
50. See American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 670-73 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Wey-
erhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
51. National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d at 116-19.
52. 435 U.S. at 542. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
53. 593 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1979).
54. The ICC is granted such authority under 49 U.S.C. § 10928 (1978).
55. 593 F.2d at 695 n.7.
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Co. v. Costle.5' There the court of appeals remanded the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) determination of the limitations of effluent
discharges required by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972.5 1 In discussing its ability to remand, the court stated that
"[a]bsent a coherent discussion - in the record - of the factual 'basis'
and legislative 'purpose' underlying EPA's conclusion. . . we are unable
to rely on our usual assumption that the Agency ... will rationally exer-
cise the duties delegated to it by Congress."58
The court, careful not to impose specific procedures, remanded the ac-
tion so that the agency could "conduct notice and comment proceedings
aimed at reassessing and more fully explaining its conclusions .... .
The type of procedures that would bring about the required results were
not specified but the court makes it clear that, because informal rulemak-
ing lacks adversarial testing, it is relatively useless to reviewing judges.60
Therefore, it would seem that the court is discretely hinting to the EPA
that more formal procedures would be necessary to reassess and explain
its decision.
56. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
57. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1948), as amended, Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977). Under these acts the EPA began a step-by-step process of issuing
effluent limitations for each industry which discharges pollutants into United States waters.
In Weyerhaeuser, American pulp and paper makers challenged the validity of EPA regula-
tions which limited the 1977 through 1983 effluent discharges of their mills.
58. 590 F.2d at 1030 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976)). The court had earlier explained that
the degree of conciseness required of an agency when stating its "basis" and "purpose" for
an informal rule varies with the nature of the regulations promulgated. If they are highly
technical and call for scientific judgments, the court has to be sure that the procedures used
to promulgate the regulations are ample to support them. 590 F.2d at 1024 n.11 (relying on
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). The court also stated that
the dual "basis and purpose" statement requirement of § 553 suggests that the EPA's
explanatory statement should discuss both the factual premises, if any, and the policy
considerations underlying the administrative action. This requirement not only aids
the reviewing court in assuring adherence to considerations appropriate under the
statute, but also permits the court to decide if the agency's conclusion is "sustainable
on the administrative record made."
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d at 1024 n.11 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Co. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. at 549). Note, however, that there seems to be no such requirement
in the APA. Scalia, supra note 9, at 395. This may be proof that the Supreme Court itself is
guilty of requiring more from an agency on common law grounds. This seems to be the basis
of the Court's decision in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973). There the Court held that an
agency can be required to provide "such additional explanation of the reasons for the
agency decision as may prove necessary ... to a proper assessment of the agency's deci-
sion." Id. at 143. See Davis, supra note 23, at 9.
59. 590 F.2d at 1031.
60. Id. at 1026.
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
It appears, then, that lower courts have taken advantage of the loop-
holes in Vermont Yankee. While they cannot impose additional proce-
dures directly, they are not restricted from remanding agency action on
substantive grounds. In the long run this tactic may be worse than impo-
sition of procedures. Now the agency is just relegated to limbo on remand
because it knows that something is wrong with the record but it does not
know how to rectify it. Before Vermont Yankee, the agency knew how to
square itself with a reviewing court. Today, the revolving door approach
suggested in SEC v. Chenery Corp."1 may become more of a reality. Fur-
thermore, a real question with this form of review is whether the court
will be able to divorce its determinations of the adequacy of the record
from the adequacy of procedures.6 2 There is a similar problem for the
agency on remand. Creating a more detailed record does not necessarily
require more procedural safeguards, but this may not be clear to the
agency. Without some guidance from the court, the agency on remand
will probably be compelled "to conduct all rulemaking proceedings with
the full panoply of procedural devices normally associated only with adju-
dicatory hearings." s This is the exact thing Justice Rehnquist was trying
to avoid in Vermont Yankee.
C. Agency Departure from Well Settled Practices
According to the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee, if an agency de-
parts from a well settled practice, the reviewing court may have grounds
for judicial intervention." Usually courts will only intervene if agency
noncompliance results in prejudice or substantial deprivation to the par-
ties relying on prior agency practice.65
61. 318 U.S. 80 (1943). See Nathanson, supra note 21, at 206. The idea suggested in
Chenery is that although an agency's result may be acceptable, the reasoning behind it may
not be. If this is the case, the court must remand to give the agency an opportunity to
provide a more thorough statement of its reasoning and better documentation. This ap-
proach was vehemently rejected by Justice Jackson as a waste of agency, as well as judicial,
time and money. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 210 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
62. The Supreme Court explained this point in Vermont Yankee.
The Court below uncritically assumed that additional procedures will automatically
result in a more adequate record .... But ... the adequacy of the "record" in this
type of proceeding is not correlated directly to the type of procedural devices em-
ployed, but rather turns on whether the agency has followed the statutory mandate of
the Administrative Procedure Act or other relevant statutes.
435 U.S. at 547.
63. 435 U.S. at 547.
64. 435 U.S. at 542. See Barr, supra note 4, at 803; comment, Administrative Procedure,
supra note 2, at 329-31.
65. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). It should be noted that an agency can
change its prior procedures, provided that it complies with the APA in doing so. See United
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Although the Supreme Court did not define what might be considered a
deviation from well settled practices of long standing, some of the lower
courts have addressed this issue. In Brown Express Inc. v. United
States5 several carriers sought review of an ICC notice which provided
that the Commission no longer had to notify existing carriers by phone,
as it had done for forty years, of applications by new carriers for emer-
gency temporary authority (ETA) to operate in the area.67 The ICC ar-
gued that the notice constituted a general policy statement and as such
was exempt from section 553 procedural requirements. The Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the Commission's "notice" was a rule69 governed by the
requirements of section 553.70 In rejecting the ICC's argument the court
stated that "[t]he exemption of § 553(b)(A) from the duty to provide no-
tice by publication does not extend to those procedural rules that depart
from existing practice and have a substantial impact on those regulated
. *... "71 Therefore, the court's scope of review was not to determine
whether the rule was "substantive" or "procedural" but whether the rule
would have a "substantial impact" on those regulated.7 2
The ICC argued that its practice of informing other carriers of applica-
tions for ETA was an "informal nonmandatory custom" not required
under its substantive statute 3 and never formalized in the ICC Field
Staff Manual or by its adoption in a formal rulemaking proceeding. The
court rejected this argument on the grounds that the notifications had
been provided for over forty years, that the Field Staff Manual "virtually
mandated" notification of existing carriers and that the reliance by these
carriers on this procedure could result in a substantial economic loss. 7 '
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (FCC decision to limit the number of
licenses issued to any one party did not prevent individuals from applying for exemptions).
66. 607 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1979).
67. The ICC's power to issue ETA was delegated to it by 49 U.S.C. § 10928 (1978).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) provides that if notice and hearing is not required by statute, the
notice and comment procedures of § 553 do not apply to "interpretive rules, general state-
ments of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice."
69. See note 5 supra.
70. The court found that the agency notice was not an interpretive rule because it in
effect changed the Commission's methodology of granting substantive rights. 607 F.2d at
700. The notice was also not a general statement of policy because it did not tell what
guidelines were to be used in awarding future ETA nor did it "set a goal that future pro-
ceedings may achieve." Id. at 701. Finally, the court determined that the notice was also not
a procedural rule because it was a regulation of general applicability that had substantial
impact on the regulated industry. Id. at 701-703.
71. Id. at 702.
72. Id.
73. 49 U.S.C. § 10928 (1978).
74. 607 F.2d at 702-03. Within one month a carrier, operating under the protested ETA,
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On the basis of this case, there appear to be several factors which a
court will take into account when determining whether agency action de-
parts from well settled practice of long standing without substantial justi-
fication. These are: 1) the number of parties affected, 2) the economic or
prejudicial impact on those parties, or the extent of their reliance on the
old practice, 3) the length of time the practice had been followed by the
agency, and 4) the extent to which the practice was in agency manuals or
other statements of procedure."
D. Notions of Common Law Fairness and Constitutional Due Process
The Supreme Court's statement in Vermont Yankee that "[a]bsent
constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the ad-
ministrative agencies 'should be free to fashion their own rules...' "7
has been interpreted to mean that lower courts still have the authority to
apply due process, which must include "basic considerations of fair-
ness."'7 It should be noted that this due process claim has received little
support in the courts. The reason for this stems from the fact that due
process procedural requirements vary from case-to-case. Simply because
an agency may limit the right of a party to an adversarial type hearing
does not mean that it has overstepped the bounds of due process. As long
as an agency provides to interested parties notice and an opportunity for
comment, as required by the APA or other statute, prior to adopting a
rule, it may use informal rulemaking procedures. However, additional
received revenues of $485,934. Id. at 702.
75. It should be noted that the Brown decision points out how the departure from well
settled practices idea can become intertwined with considerations for procedural and com-
mon-law fairness. The concepts of substantial impact and notice and comment requirements
of § 553 are both fraught with the perception of fairness to the parties affected by agency
regulation. In fact, Judge Clark points out that the Supreme Court has held that the notice
and comment provisions of § 553 "were designed to assure fairness. . . ." 607 F.2d at 701
(quoting NLRB v. Wyman-Gardon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969)). Moreover, the court notes
that although it held § 553 required notice and comment procedures in that case, notions of
common-law fairness might require notice and comment procedures to rulemaking exempt
from such procedures in other cases. 607 F.2d at 703 n.7. See notes 79-94 infra and accom-
panying text.
This concept flies in the face of the purpose of the APA and the strict mandates of Ver-
mont Yankee, where the Court held that the APA provided the maximum procedures re-
quired of an agency promulgating a rule. 435 U.S. at 524, 542-48. Nevertheless, in Brown the
Fifth Circuit holds that common-law fairness may require more. Note that this idea as
worded and placed in the opinion is totally insulated from Supreme Court review and can
be resurrected at another time to serve as the basis of a decision. See Scalia, supra note 9,
at 398-99.
76. 435 U.S. at 543.
77. Davis, supra note 23, at 16.
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procedures may be required if the rulemaking rests on factual assump-
tions that would violate accepted notions of fundamental fairness if
adopted without procedural safeguards.7 8
An example of the fundamental fairness notion is provided in Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Costle.7 9 The petitioning companies sought review of EPA
regulations limiting the amount of effluent discharges from their pulp, pa-
per, and paperboard mill.80 The regulations were to be promulgated infor-
mally under section 553(b)8' notice and comment procedures. However, a
problem arose when the EPA, after giving the petitioners four opportuni-
ties for notice and comment, recalculated its Final Limitations with
neither notice and comment by the petitioners nor explanation for the
deviation in the agency's record.82 The petitioners, relying on new data,
asserted that the figures set forth in the Interim Final Limitations were
more accurate. 83 The EPA responded that, even if it started from scratch
with the new data, it could justify the Final Limitation figures." The
court found this rationalization to be inadequate and remanded this case
for "notice and comment proceedings aimed at reassessing and more fully
explaining its conclusions." 85
The D.C. Circuit noted that its review of the EPA's "procedural integ-
rity in promulgating the regulations ... [was] the product of [its] inde-
pendent judgment, and its main reliance in ensuring that, despite [the
EPA's] broad discretion, the Agency [had] not acted unfairly .. ..",86
The court based this assertion of judicial independence in reviewing
agency procedures on "this country's historical reliance on the courts as
exponents of procedural fairness.18 7 The D.C. Circuit justified this type of
review as a method of keeping the EPA honest and, hence, ensuring that
the Agency had followed the APA in order to "maximize the susceptibil-
ity of the record to judicial review.""
Although the court showed its deference to Vermont Yankee by stating
that it is generally up to the agency to select the type of techniques that
are necessary to "accomplish the goal of public understanding and partic-
78. See Barr, supra note 4, at 800-02. See also notes 59 & 75 supra.
79. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 56-60 supra.
80. 590 F.2d at 1019.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). See note 4 supra.
82. 590 F.2d at 1029.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1030.
85. Id. at 1031.
86. Id. at 1027.
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 1027-28.
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ipation," 9 there is nothing in the APA or the EPA substantive statute
that would require any procedure "beyond" notice and comment.9s The
D.C. Circuit held that, in keeping with notions of procedural fairness, the
more complex the regulations, the more rigorous the procedures used to
promulgate them must be.91 Vermont Yankee explicitly held that the
APA provided the "maximum procedural requirements which Congress
was willing to impose upon agencies '9 2 no matter how complex the regu-
lations might be. Ironically the court relied on Vermont Yankee as sup-
port for the proposition that if the record on review does not sufficiently
substantiate the agency's finding then the case can be remanded for a
more thorough record.93 The D.C. Circuit has interpreted this to mean
that if the record is insufficient then the agency procedures used in gener-
ating the record are likewise inadequate.9
E. Prohibition on Ex Parte Communications
The prohibition on ex parte contacts is in line with the ideas of com-
mon law fairness, procedural due process and to some extent adequacy of
the record." Neither Supreme Court decisions nor specific provisions of
the APA provide for ex parte contacts;9" however, lower courts have uti-
lized this method to set aside agency decisions that are, either in whole or
in part, based upon information not disclosed in the record on review
which is received by the agency after the notice and comment stage of
rulemaking has been adjourned.
According to D.C. Circuit Judge Wright 7 the advent of the prohibition
on ex parte contacts was heralded by the Citizens to Preserve Overton
89. Id. at 1028.
90. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976). See note 4 supra.
91. 590 F.2d at 1028. The court held that the "promulgation process must provide a de-
gree of public awareness, understanding and participation commensurate with the resulting
regulations." Id.
92. 435 U.S. at 524.
93. 590 F.2d at 1030 (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549).
94. 590 F.2d at 1030. See notes 45-64 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the problems caused by this type of remand, see note 61 supra and accompanying text.
Several cases ultimately decided on other grounds discuss fairness to the parties. See, e.g.,
WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1979). For a discussion of basic
fairness and procedural due process in the context of ex parte contacts, see National Small
Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. ICC, 590 F.2d 345 (1978); United States Lines, Inc. v.
FMC, 584 F.2d 519 (1978).
95. See Ornoff, Ex Parte Communication in Informal Rulemaking: Judicial Interven-
tion in Administrative Procedures, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 73 (1980).
96. See Scalia, supra note 9, at 396.
97. Wright, Rulemaking and Judicial Review, 30 ADMIN. L. REv. 461, 464-66 (1978).
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Park, Inc. v. Volpe.95 In Overton Park, the Supreme Court held that, in
order to determine whether an agency has acted arbitrarily or capri-
ciously when informally promulgating a rule, the court must conduct "a
thorough, probing, in-depth review,"'" and must make a "searching and
careful"10 0 inquiry into the facts. In Judge Wright's opinion, for a court to
follow the Supreme Court's mandate on review, all the facts and data
upon which an agency based its decision, including ex parte communica-
tions, must be set out in the record. 101 It is not clear from subsequent
Supreme Court decisions whether the Court meant for the holding in
Overton Park to apply to ex parte contacts. However, in light of the
proliferation of cases decided on this basis, it is apparent that this is what
the lower courts interpret the decision to mean.102
Indeed, soon after Vermont Yankee had been decided, the D.C. Circuit,
relying upon Overton Park, held that the Federal Maritime Commission's
(FMC) reliance on ex parte contacts precluded adequate judicial re-
view.103 The challenger was thus denied an opportunity for comment as
mandated by the FMC's substantive statute's requirement for a "hear-
ing"1°4 and, hence, this action violated fundamental fairness.105 The court
in this case had to interpret the FMC substantive statute before the
Commission could decide whether agreements between shipping lines,
that would normally be held to violate antitrust regulations, would be
permitted as in the public interest. Although the court held that the stat-
ute did not require the hearing to be made "on the record," it did impose
98. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
99. Id. at 415.
100. Id. at 416.
101. Wright, supra note 97, at 465.
102. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); but see WNCN Lis-
teners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1979); National Crushed Stone Ass'n v.
EPA, 601 F.2d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 1979); Blanco Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulation
Comm'n, 598 F.2d 152, 166 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011,
1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978); National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. ICC, 590 F.2d
345 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
103. United States Lines, Inc. v. FMC, 584 F.2d 519, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (ocean carrier
sought review of an FMC order approving an anticompetitive agreement between two other
shipping lines). The standard for review in cases such as this is whether the agency's actions
are arbitrary and capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
104. Section 15 of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970), delegates to the FMC
the power to exempt anticompetitive agreements among overseas carriers from the antitrust
laws when it is in the public interest to do so.
105. The court held that the public interest is not furthered by an agency's reliance upon
ex parte contacts "[flor such references and communications violate the ideals of fairness
and public participation which are embodied in the statutory requirement of a hearing
...." 584 F.2d at 543. See also id. at 535, 536, 541.
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"certain minimum constraints on the procedure followed by the
agency." 06 According to the court, the FMC violated one of these con-
straints by relying on ex parte communications from other shippers. In
distinguishing this case from Vermont Yankee, the court acknowledged
that agencies have the freedom to establish their own procedures but do
not have the "freedom to ignore statutory requirements.' ' 0 7 It held that
by not providing a hearing on the information received through ex parte
communications, the agency had not acted in accordance with statutory
requirements.1 08 As further support the court held that ex parte commu-
nications obstruct judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard because the court does not have "the full administrative record that
was before the [agency official] at the time he made his decision." 10 9
Here again, a court has imposed more upon an agency than is man-
dated by the APA which, according to Vermont Yankee, is supposed to
provide the maximum required procedures. It might be argued that the
ideas of procedural due process and common law fairness, which are cir-
cumvented by agency reliance on ex parte contacts, fall under the "ex-
tremely compelling circumstances"1 10 or "constitutional constraints""'
exceptions in Vermont Yankee. Whether this is true is not yet known,
but it is clear that, if an agency relies on undisclosed ex parte communi-
cations in making its decision, the agency action will probably be set
aside." 2
106. Id. at 537.
107. Id. at 542 n.63.
108. The FMC relied upon statements made by other shipping lines in favor of the pro-
posed anticompetitive agreement without notifying United States Lines, Inc. or giving them
an opportunity to comment upon these statements.
109. 584 F.2d at 541 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at
420).
110. 401 U.S. at 54.
111. Id. One commentator believes that the "compelling circumstances" exception can be
used to justify the imposition of hybrid procedures so that a more adequate record can be
generated. Barr, supra note 4, at 804.
112. Contra, Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 670 (2d Cir. 1979). There
are other possible exceptions to the holdings in Vermont Yankee. One commentator has
taken the view that had the APA, its legislative history and the combined legislative histo-
ries of the AEC's enabling statutes been correctly interpreted by both the D.C. Circuit
Court and the Supreme Court, both courts would have realized that §§ 556 and 557 applied
to the case. Therefore, he concludes that further procedural safeguards are required of the
Commission before it can promulgate its rule. Nathanson, supra note 21, at 183.
Professor Davis points to § 559 of the APA to support his contention that courts may
impose hybrid procedures to further common law notions of fairness. Section 559 provides
that nothing in that subchapter limits or repeals "requirements imposed by statute or other-
wise recognized by law." His interpretation of the statute and its associated legislative his-
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I. CONCLUSION
In light of the aforementioned appellate court decisions, it has become
apparent that Vermont Yankee has been construed to stand for only one
proposition. Reviewing courts cannot impose procedures on an agency be-
yond those mandated by the APA or other relevant statutes. It does not
preclude a court from setting aside or remanding agency action on sub-
stantive grounds. Does, however, the mere prohibition of judicial imposi-
tion of hybrid procedures solve the problems that Justice Rehnquist was
trying to avoid in Vermont Yankee?113 When a court remands agency ac-
tion on substantive grounds it still can impose its own notion of what is
"most likely to further some vague, undefined public good,"11' 4 as well as
"seriously interfere" with agency procedure prescribed by Congress.115 Ei-
ther congressional action or a more active role by the Supreme Court in
the development of administrative law is necessary. Strycker's Bay
Neighborhood Council Inc. v. Karlen11 6 intimates that the Court plans to
thoroughly cover each issue discussed in Vermont Yankee on a case by
case basis providing a reasoned opinion on each point of law. There are
problems with this approach though. Will the Court act soon enough to
save agencies from the quagmire of the appellate court docket? Will the
lower courts follow the Supreme Court's commands? If not, it would seem
that only congressional amendment clarifying and updating the APA will
prevent lower court intrusion into agency decisionmaking.
Jon A. Mueller
tory leads him to believe that the phrase "otherwise recognized by law" allows courts to
develop a common law of administrative procedure. According to Davis, because Vermont
Yankee contravenes judicially created common law which imposes hybrid procedures, it
would seem to stand in direct contradiction to § 559 of the APA. Davis, supra note 23, at 10.
After his survey of the APA, its legislative history and the legislative histories of the
AEC's enabling statutes, Professor Nathanson contends that the rule which the Commission
was trying to promulgate was one "required to be made on the record." As such it met the
§ 553(c) exemption and triggered the further procedural safeguards of §§ 556 and 557.
Therefore, both the courts of appeal and the Supreme Court had neglected to apply the
relevant provisions of the APA in Vermont Yankee. Nathanson, supra note 21, at 193. It is
conceivable that a lower court could use either of these two approaches to impose hybrid
procedures despite the Vermont Yankee holding. It should be noted that Professor Nathan-
son's point of view seems to be restricted to cases which relate to licensing of nuclear power
plants or enabling statutes similar to the AEC's, whereas Professor Davis' position can be'
used in all administrative actions that fall under the domain of the APA and administrative
common law.
113. 435 U.S. at 546-48.
114. Id. at 549.
115. Id. at 548.
116. 444 U.S. 223 (1980).

